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Symposium on the Law 
and Politics of Foreign 
Investment 
David Sloss∗ 
On February 1-2, 2013, Santa Clara University School of Law hosted a conference on 
the law and politics of foreign investment. The conference included a keynote address by 
Rudolf Dolzer; four main papers by Roger Alford, August Reinisch, Catherine Rogers, and 
Jason Yackee; and commentaries on those four papers by a distinguished group of 
scholars and practitioners. This symposium issue of the Journal includes revised versions 
of the papers presented at that conference. 
Professor Dolzer’s paper presents a masterful summary of the current state of the fair 
and equitable treatment (FET) standard in international investment law.1 He focuses on 
the question whether application of the FET standard by arbitral tribunals “has matured 
enough to make it manageable on the operational level so that it is justified to speak of a 
legally distinct, manageable rule available for practical purposes of investment 
arbitration.”2 He answers this question in the affirmative, showing that arbitral 
jurisprudence has identified “groups and clusters of subgroups with more defined 
contours” that help to operationalize the FET standard.3  His analysis focuses primarily 
on the concept of legitimate expectations. While acknowledging that the FET standard 
encompasses more than just legitimate expectations, he argues that “[t]he protection of 
legitimate expectations [of investors] . . . [is] the central pillar in the understanding and 
application of the FET standard.”4 Professor Dolzer identifies seven distinct elements of 
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1. Rudolf Dolzer, Fair and Equitable Treatment: Today’s Contours, 12 SANTA CLARA J. OF INT’L L. 7 
(2013).  
2. Id. at 11. 
3. Id. at 15. 
4. Id. at 17. 
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the concept of legitimate expectations that tribunals have applied to put flesh on the 
skeleton of the FET standard. He contends that arbitral practice, by identifying “a 
number of rationally manageable subcategories,” has confirmed “the usefulness and the 
operational manageability of the” FET standard.5 
Roger Alford’s insightful and thought-provoking paper identifies five key areas where 
international trade and investment law are converging.6 First, he discusses the trend 
toward incorporating trade and investment provisions into a single treaty.7 Second, he 
analyzes “the converging commitments in trade and investment arbitration against 
protectionism and discrimination.”8 Third, he addresses situations where a single 
underlying dispute gives rise to dispute settlement procedures in both the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and investment treaty arbitration.9 Fourth, he discusses the use of 
trade remedies to enforce arbitration awards.10 Finally, he addresses the potential future 
use of investment treaty arbitration to enforce international trade rules.11 The overall 
picture is one of increasing overlap between two distinct bodies of international economic 
law. 
Andrea Bjorklund’s commentary largely accepts Professor Alford’s descriptive account 
of the convergence between trade and investment law.12 Her paper offers some tentative 
thoughts about the potential costs and benefits of convergence. Ideally, she hopes, “one 
might see the development of complementary regimes such that each works to provide 
redress for the matters that it is most suited to handle.”13 However, she cautions, “[t]here 
is some danger that convergence in the trade and investment regimes simply exacerbates 
the already existing imbalance between powerful and less powerful actors in the 
international regime.”14 
Todd Weiler’s commentary on Alford’s paper takes a different approach.15 Weiler 
contends that Alford’s analysis of anti-discrimination norms overlooks the nineteenth 
century roots of modern international economic law. Weiler’s fascinating historical 
analysis contends that rules governing most-favored-nation treatment (MFN) and 
national treatment (NT) converged in the middle of the nineteenth century into a single 
 
5.  Id. at 32-33. 
6.  Roger P. Alford, The Convergence of International Trade and Investment Arbitration, 12 SANTA 
CLARA J. OF INT’L L. 35 (2013).  
7.  Id. at 38. 
8.  Id. at 37. 
9.  Id. at 44. 
10.  Id. at 50. 
11.  Id. at 55. 
12.  Andrea K. Bjorklund, Convergence or Complementarity?, 12 SANTA CLARA J. OF INT’L L. 65 (2013). 
13  Id. at 67. 
14  Id. at 75. 
15  Todd J. Weiler, Treatment No Less Favorable Provisions within the Context of International 
Investment Law: “Kindly Please Check Your International Trade Law Conceptions at the Door,” 12 
SANTA CLARA J. OF INT’L L. 77 (2013). 
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“treatment no less favorable” (TNLF) standard.16 Later, in the twentieth century, 
international trade and international investment law diverged into two separate legal 
regimes. Thus, he contends, in the modern era “we are not dealing with convergence, but 
rather re-convergence.”17 He closes with a plea not to “confuse our understanding of how 
NT works in the [trade] context for how TNLF works (or ought to work) in the” context of 
international investment law.18 
August Reinisch’s paper presents a detailed assessment of various issues related to 
the future of European investment law.19 His starting point is the Treaty of Lisbon, 
concluded in 2007, which transferred at least partial responsibility for negotiating and 
implementing international investment treaties from individual Member States to the 
European Union (EU).20 The treaty has sparked a lively debate within Europe concerning 
the division of competence between the EU and its Member States. It has also sparked a 
debate among the main EU organs – the European Parliament, the Commission, and the 
Council – regarding the preferred future direction of EU investment policy.21 Professor 
Reinisch’s task is complicated by the fact that he takes aim at a rapidly moving target. 
Even so, he does a masterful job of mapping out the complex substantive and 
organizational issues at stake, and offers some tentative predictions about the likely 
future resolution of key issues. 
Mark Clodfelter’s commentary takes a provocative stand on three discrete issues 
raised in Professor Reinisch’s paper.22 First, Clodfelter contends that recent evidence 
points to “standards emerging from EU action that will diverge greatly from the more 
open-ended language of contemporary Member State BITs, and more closely resemble 
those adopted by the North American states.”23 Second, he argues that the European 
Parliament “has strongly signaled that ISDS [investor-state dispute settlement] is not to 
be considered an indispensable element of investment protection . . . the US-Australia 
solution of dispensing with ISDS altogether is a real option for the EU.”24 Third, he 
claims there are “compelling” arguments for the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to 
invalidate existing bilateral investment treaties (BITs) between EU Member States on 
the ground that they violate fundamental provisions of EU law.25 
 
16  Id. at 79. 
17.  Id. at 109. 
18.  Id. 
19.  August Reinisch, The EU on the Investment Path – Quo Vadis Europe? The Future of EU BITs 
and other Investment Agreements, 12 SANTA CLARA J. OF INT’L L. 111 (2013). 
20.  See id. at 113. 
21.  See id. at 119. 
22.  Mark A. Clodfelter, The Future Direction of Investment Agreements in the European Union, 12 
SANTA CLARA J. OF INT’L L. 159 (2013). 
23.  Id. at 163. 
24.  Id. at 176.  
25.  Id. at 178. 
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Julie Maupin’s commentary raises two fundamental questions about the future of EU 
investment law.26 First, she asks, “where should European investment policy go next?”27 
She recommends “a robust normative debate to clarify the end goals of a shared EU 
international investment policy,”28 and continued dialogue “that generates some 
mutually agreed means of either balancing or prioritizing among . . . competing policy 
visions.”29 Second, she presents an insightful analysis of the comparative institutional 
strengths and weaknesses of the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Commission, and the European Court of Justice in shaping the future direction of 
European investment law and policy. She claims that “[t]he structural checks and 
balances which the Lisbon Treaty imposes upon each institution’s competencies in the 
investment arena effectively prohibits any one institution from moving forward without 
getting the others on board.”30 Praising the system of checks and balances, she concludes 
by speculating that “the Lisbon Treaty may one day be regarded as the dawn . . . of a 
more democratic international investment law system.”31 
Catherine Rogers’ paper evaluates the current state of empirical research on the 
arbitrators who decide international investment disputes.32 Part One of her paper 
acknowledges the value of empirical research, but warns that such research “must be 
read, interpreted, and relied on only with a full understanding of its limitations.”33 She 
then presents an insightful analysis of those limitations, focusing on four primary 
methodological challenges for empirical research on investment treaty arbitrators.34 Part 
Two addresses two specific reform proposals that are based, at least partly, on empirical 
research. Rogers’ analysis highlights “the risks of linking empirical research to specific 
reform proposals.”35 Part Three offers several recommendations for improving future 
empirical research about investment treaty arbitrators.36 
Chiara Giorgetti’s commentary on Professor Rogers’ paper contends that empirical 
research is most useful “when a question that can only have a yes/no answer is posited 
and objective criteria are evaluated.”37 She evaluates available data on diversity to show 
 
26.  Julie A. Maupin, Where Should Europe’s Investment Path Lead? Reflections on August Reinisch, 
“Quo Vadis Europe?”, 12 SANTA CLARA J. OF INT’L L. 183 (2013). 
27.  Id. at 189. 
28.  Id. at 193. 
29.  Id. at 196. 
30.  Id. at 222. 
31.  Id. 
32.  Catherine A. Rogers, The Politics of International Investment Arbitrators, 12 SANTA CLARA J. OF 
INT’L L. 223 (2013). 
33.  Id. at 232. 
34.  Id. at 232-38. 
35.  Id. at 240. 
36.  Id. at 252. 
37.  Chiara Giorgetti, Is the Truth in the Eyes of the Beholder? The Perils and Benefits of Empirical 
Research in International Investment Arbitration, 12 SANTA CLARA J. OF INT’L L. 263, 269 (2013). 
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that the group of people who serve as arbitrators in investment disputes manifests a 
troubling lack of geographical and gender diversity.38 Based on that data, she offers 
several proposals for enhancing the geographical and gender diversity of investment 
treaty arbitrators.39 
Jason Yackee’s paper contends that social scientists engaged in empirical analysis of 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) have much to gain by collaborating with legal 
academics.40 He acknowledges that the plea for greater collaboration between lawyers 
and social scientists is nothing new. However, he notes, others have assumed that “the 
benefits of collaboration . . . flow in a single direction – from the methodologically well-
trained social scientist to the methodologically naïve or illiterate legal scholar.”41 He 
argues that benefits can flow in the other direction also. He supports this claim by 
presenting a critique of a particular empirical study of BITs performed by two political 
scientists, showing how the study would have benefited from greater legal expertise.42 He 
then presents an alternative model for analyzing investor-state dispute settlement 
clauses in BITs that incorporates a lawyer’s perspective.43  
In her commentary on Professor Yackee’s paper, Catherine Amirfar offers the 
perspective of a practitioner with extensive experience in investor-state arbitration.44 She 
endorses Yackee’s claim that empirical studies “can be much improved through greater 
interdisciplinary collaboration between lawyers and social scientists.”45 However, she 
adds, “the search for expertise should not be limited to the legal academy . . . it should 
encompass practitioners as well.”46 Drawing on her own experience, she challenges 
Yackee’s rank ordering of different types of investor-state dispute settlement clauses and 
presents an alternative ordering that, in her view, better reflects the reality of investor-
state arbitration.47 
Sergio Puig’s commentary on Professor Yackee’s paper approaches the topic from a 
different angle.48 Like Amirfar, he endorses Yackee’s “call for more empirical and 
 
38.  See id. at 269-71. 
39.  Id. at 272-75. 
40.  Jason Webb Yackee, Do States Bargain over Investor-State Dispute Settlement? Or, Toward 
Greater Collaboration in the Study of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 12 SANTA CLARA J. OF INT’L L. 
277 (2013). 
41.  Id. at 280. 
42.  Id. at 283-87. 
43.  Id. at 287-94. 
44.  Catherine M. Amirfar, Dispute Settlement Clauses in Investor-State Arbitration: An Informed 
Approach to Empirical Studies About Law: A Response to Professor Yackee, 12 SANTA CLARA J. OF 
INT’L L. 303 (2013). 
45.  Id. at 306.  
46.  Id. 
47.  Id. at 307-15. 
48.  Sergio Puig, Does Bureaucratic Inertia Matter in Treaty Bargaining? Or, Toward Greater use of 
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interdisciplinary research in the field of international investment law.”49 However, he 
gently criticizes Yackee’s exclusive focus on quantitative analysis. “Quants are only part 
of the empirical legal community . . . Qualitative empirical research is as valuable as 
quantitative research, and provides possibilities for giving rich context to legal 
behavior.”50 
Overall, the papers in this symposium make a valuable contribution to the burgeoning 
body of scholarship on international investment law. Hopefully, this brief introduction 
has whetted the reader’s appetite for more. Both novices and experts stand to learn a 
good deal by reading the entire volume.  
 
49.  Id. at 318. 
50.  Id. at 320. 
